Περὶ φιλίας: love in the Stoa

Do the Later Stoics talk about love? A word-search for erōs, philia, agapē, and storgē returns almost nothing in Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus. The nouns are sparse. The passages below use other lemmas: phileîn (to love), eúnoia (goodwill), sympátheia (sympathy), philánthrōpos (lover of humanity), and the relation between proaíresis (choice) and the capacity to love at all.

Epictetus and Marcus come first below. The school's founders (Zeno, Chrysippus, Cleanthes) follow: their work survives only in fragments and testimonia quoted by later authors, and the two claims that organise the late material (that only the wise can love, and that love is one binding force running through the cosmos) are already set out there, the second with definitions and a taxonomy.

Epictetus: Discourses 2.22, Περὶ φιλίας

The longest sustained treatment in this pair of authors is Discourses 2.22, titled Περὶ φιλίας (On Friendship/Love). Epictetus opens with a syllogism on who can love, then takes up the interlocutor who says he loves his child though he is foolish.

Epictetus, Discourses, Eulogikon: ojw-ac, ref. 2.22

τοῦ φρονίμου τοίνυν ἐστὶ μόνου τὸ φιλεῖν.

toû phronímou toínun estì mónou tò phileîn.

Therefore it belongs to the wise person alone to love.

The interlocutor admits he is foolish because his impressions toss him about: he is pained, afraid, envious, confused. Epictetus asks whether he wavers in love too. The same people are now good, now bad; now embraced, now hated. The one deceived about someone cannot be their friend. The test: throw meat between two friendly dogs. Throw a piece of land between you and your child. Throw a pretty girl, a political office. The brothers Eteocles and Polynices were raised together, slept together, kissed each other, until tyranny fell between them like a piece of meat. Epictetus quotes Euripides, Phoenissae 622:

Epictetus, Discourses, Eulogikon: ojw-ac, ref. 2.22

κἀμὲ τοῦδ' ἔρως ἔχει.

kamè toûd' érōs échei.

And me too: desire for this holds me.

Epictetus then generalises:

Epictetus, Discourses, Eulogikon: ojw-ac, ref. 2.22

πᾶν ζῷον οὐδενὶ οὕτως ᾠκείωται ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ συμφέροντι.

pân zôion oudenì hoútōs ōikeíōtai hōs tô idíō symphéronti.

Every creature is affiliated with nothing so much as its own advantage.

Whatever seems to hinder that advantage (brother, father, child, erṓmenos (beloved), erastḗs (lover)) it hates, rejects, curses. Philía (friendship/love), Epictetus says, is present only where pístis (trust), aidōs (reverence), and dósis toû kaloû (the giving of the beautiful) are present, and these are possible only for the person whose good lies in proaíresis, not in externals:

Epictetus, Discourses, Eulogikon: ojw-ac, ref. 2.22

ποῦ γὰρ ἀλλαχοῦ φιλία ἢ ὅπου πίστις, ὅπου αἰδώς, ὅπου δόσις τοῦ καλοῦ, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων οὐδενός;

poû gàr allachoû philía ē hópou pístis, hópou aidōs, hópou dósis toû kaloû, tôn d’ állōn oudenós;

For where else is friendship, except where there is trust, where there is reverence, where there is the giving of the beautiful, and nothing of the other things?

Marcus Aurelius: love as cosmic binding

Marcus does not write a treatise on love. At To Himself 9.9, he traces a chain of attraction through the elements and then through intelligent nature:

Marcus Aurelius, To Himself, Eulogikon: qpy-aa, ref. 9.9.1

〈Πάντα〉 ὅσα κοινοῦ τινος μετέχει πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενὲς σπεύδει. τὸ γεῶδες πᾶν ῥέπει ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν· τὸ ὑγρὸν πᾶν σύρρουν· τὸ ἀερῶδες ὁμοίως, ὥστε χρῄζειν τῶν διειργόντων καὶ βίᾳ· τὸ πῦρ ἀνωφερὲς μὲν διὰ τὸ στοιχειῶδες πῦρ, παντὶ δὲ πυρὶ ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὸ συνεξάπτεσθαι ἕτοιμον οὕτως, ὥστε καὶ πᾶν τὸ ὑλικὸν τὸ ὀλίγῳ ξηρότερον εὐέξαπτον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐγκεκρᾶσθαι αὐτῷ τὸ κωλυτικὸν πρὸς ἔξαψιν. καὶ τοίνυν πᾶν τὸ κοινῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως μέτοχον πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς ὁμοίως σπεύδει ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον· ὅσῳ γάρ ἐστι κρεῖττον παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα, τοσούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ συγκιρνᾶσθαι τῷ οἰκείῳ καὶ συγχεῖσθαι ἑτοιμότερον.

〈Pánta〉 hósa koinoû tinós metéchei pròs tò homogenès speúdei. tò geôdes pân rhépei epì tḕn gên· tò hygròn pân sýrroun· tò aerôdes homoíōs, hōste khrḗzein tôn dieirgóntōn kaì bíā· tò pûr anōpherès mèn dià tò stoikheiôdes pûr, pantì dè pyrì entaûtha pròs tò syneexáptesthai hétoimon hoútōs, hōste kaì pân tò hylikòn tò olígō xēróteron euexaptón einai dià tò élattō enkekrasthai autô tò kōlytikòn pròs éxapsin. kaì toínun pân tò koinês noerâs phýseōs métochon pròs tò syngenès homoíōs speúdei ē kaì mâllon· hósō gár esti kreîtton parà tà állā, tosoútō kaì pròs tò synkirnasthai tô oikeíō kaì synkheîsthai hetoimóteron.

All things that share in something common press toward what is of the same kind. Everything earthy falls toward earth; everything wet flows together; everything airy likewise, so as to need what separates and force; fire is upward-bearing because of elemental fire, and every fire here is ready to blaze up together with any other fire, so that all slightly drier material is easily kindled because less of what hinders ignition is mixed into it. And everything that shares in a common intelligent nature likewise presses toward what is akin, or even more so; for the more it is superior to the other things, by so much is it readier to mingle with what is its own and to blend together.

At the next station he names how the gathering-together (tò synagōgón) intensifies at each level:

Marcus Aurelius, To Himself, Eulogikon: qpy-aa, ref. 9.9.2

εὐθὺς γοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀλόγων εὑρέθη σμήνη καὶ ἀγέλαι καὶ νεοσσοτροφίαι καὶ οἷον ἔρωτες· ψυχαὶ γὰρ ἤδη ἦσαν ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸ συναγωγὸν ἐν τῷ κρείττονι ἐπιτεινόμενον εὑρίσκετο, οἷον οὔτε ἐπὶ φυτῶν ἦν οὔτε ἐπὶ λίθων ἢ ξύλων. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν λογικῶν ζῴων πολιτεῖαι καὶ φιλίαι καὶ οἶκοι καὶ σύλλογοι καὶ ἐν πολέμοις συνθῆκαι καὶ ἀνοχαί. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἔτι κρειττόνων καὶ διεστηκότων τρόπον τινὰ ἕνωσις ὑπέστη οἵα ἐπὶ τῶν ἄστρων· οὕτως ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον ἐπανάβασις συμπάθειαν καὶ ἐν διεστῶσιν ἐργάσασθαι ἐδύνατο.

euthùs goûn epì mèn tôn alógōn heuréthē smḗnē kaì agélai kaì neossotrophíai kaì hoîon érōtes· psychaì gàr ḗdē ēsan entaûtha kaì tò synagōgòn en tô kreíttoni epiteinómenon heurísketo, hoîon oute epì phytôn ēn oute epì líthōn ē xýlōn. epì dè tôn logikôn zṓōn politeîai kaì philíai kaì oîkoi kaì sýllogoi kaì en polémois synthêkai kaì anokhaí. epì dè tôn éti kreittónōn kaì diestēkóton trópon tina hénōsis hypéstē hoía epì tôn ástrōn· hoútōs hē epì tò kreîtton epanábasis sympátheian kaì en diestôsin ergásasthai edýnato.

Straightway, then, among irrational creatures there were found swarms and herds and nest-tending and, as it were, loves; for souls were already present here, and the gathering-together, intensified in what is superior, was found, as it was not among plants or among stones or wood. Among rational living creatures: cities and friendships and households and assemblies, and in wars agreements and truces. Among those still more superior and in a way separated: a union such as among the stars; thus the ascent toward what is better could produce sympathy even among things at a distance.

Epictetus: the lover of humanity

At Gnomology (Extended) #46:

Epictetus, Gnomology (Extended), Eulogikon: ojw-ae, ref. 46

Οὐδεὶς φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλήδονος καὶ φιλόδοξος φιλάνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ μόνος ὁ φιλόκαλος.

Oudeìs philokhrḗmatos kaì philḗdonos kaì philódoxos philánthrōpos, allà mónos ho philókalos.

No lover of money, lover of pleasure, or lover of glory is a lover of humanity, only the lover of the beautiful.

The phil- compounds are ranked here. Philókalos (lover of the beautiful) stands against philokhrḗmatos, philḗdōnos, and philódoxos.

Marcus: goodwill as intrinsically beautiful

At To Himself 4.20.1, Marcus lists what is truly beautiful (tò óntōs kalón):

Marcus Aurelius, To Himself, Eulogikon: qpy-aa, ref. 4.20.1

τὸ δὲ δὴ ὄντως καλὸν τίνος χρείαν ἔχει; οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ νόμος, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλήθεια, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ εὔνοια ἢ αἰδώς· τί τούτων διὰ τὸ ἐπαινεῖσθαι καλόν ἐστιν ἢ ψεγόμενον φθείρεται;

tò dè dḕ óntōs kalòn tínos khréian échei; ou mâllon ē nómos, ou mâllon ē alḗtheia, ou mâllon ē eúnoia ē aidōs· tí toútōn dià tò epaineîsthai kalón estin ē phegómenon phtheíretai;

But what is truly beautiful, what need does it have? No more than law, no more than truth, no more than goodwill or reverence; which of these is beautiful because it is praised, or is destroyed because it is blamed?

Eúnoia stands alongside law and truth as something that needs no external praise to be what it is.

Rolling back: Zeno of Citium

Zeno's Republic (Πολιτεία) is lost. Diogenes Laertius reports one of its claims, in which phílos (friend) is one of four predicates restricted to the spoudaîos (the excellent person):

Zeno of Citium, Testimonies and Fragments, Eulogikon: ies-aa, ref. 222

πάλιν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ παριστάντα πολίτας καὶ φίλους καὶ οἰκείους καὶ ἐλευθέρους τοὺς σπουδαίους μόνον.

pálin en tê politeíā paristánta polítas kaì phílous kaì oikeíous kaì eleuthérous toùs spoudaíous mónon.

Again, in the Republic he presents only the excellent as citizens and friends and kin and free.

The same restriction returns in Epictetus 2.22 above, where only the wise can love. Clement of Alexandria reports the source of the thesis, that Zeno took it from Plato:

Zeno of Citium, Testimonies and Fragments, Eulogikon: ies-aa, ref. 223

Ζήνων τε ὁ Στωϊκός, παρὰ Πλάτωνος λαβών, ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πάντας ἀλλήλων εἶναι φίλους λέγει.

Zḗnōn te ho Stōikós, parà Plátōnos labṓn, ho dè apò tês barbárou philosophías, toùs agathoùs pántas allḗlōn eînai phílous légei.

Zeno the Stoic, taking it from Plato (and Plato from barbarian philosophy), says that all the good are friends of one another.

Asked what a friend is, Zeno gave a definition repeated throughout later Stoicism:

Zeno of Citium, Testimonies and Fragments, Eulogikon: ies-aa, ref. 324

ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἔστι φίλος „ἄλλος, 〈ἔφη〉, οἷος ἐγώ.“

erōtētheìs tí ésti phílos: állos, éphē, hoîos egṓ.

Asked what a friend is: another, he said, such as I am.

A scholion on Apollonius of Rhodes preserves Zeno reading the Eros of Hesiod's cosmogony as fire, the active principle:

Zeno of Citium, Testimonies and Fragments, Eulogikon: ies-aa, ref. 104

τρίτον δὲ Ἔρωτα γεγονέναι καθ’ Ἡσίοδον, ἵνα τὸ πῦρ παραστήσῃ· πυρωδέστερον γὰρ πάθος Ἔρως.

tríton dè Érōta gegonénai kath’ Hēsíodon, hína tò pŷr parastḗsē· pyrōdésteron gàr páthos Érōs.

And third, Eros came to be, according to Hesiod, in order to represent fire; for Eros is the most fiery passion.

Chrysippus of Soli

Chrysippus, the school's third head, leaves definitions and a taxonomy. Stobaeus preserves his definition of érōs, whose genus is not desire (epithymía) but an impulse toward friend-making (philopoiḯa), with two adjacent terms:

Chrysippus of Soli, Moral Fragments, Eulogikon: kms-ae, ref. 395

ἔρως δὲ ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον· πόθος δὲ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἔρωτι ἀπόντος· ἵμερος δὲ ἐπιθυμία φίλου ἀπόντος ὁμιλίας·

érōs dè epibolḕ philopoiḯas dià kállos emphainómenon· póthos dè epithymía toû érōti apóntos· hímeros dè epithymía phílou apóntos homilías·

Eros is a directed impulse toward friend-making, occasioned by apparent beauty; póthos is desire for one absent in love; hímeros is desire for converse with an absent friend.

Andronicus, in On the Passions, records three kinds of érōs, the third the friend-making impulse again. The clause in square brackets is marked doubtful in the edition:

Chrysippus of Soli, Moral Fragments, Eulogikon: kms-ae, ref. 397

Ἔρως δὲ ἐπιθυμία σωματικῆς συνουσίας. ἄλλος ἔρω ς· ἐπιθυμία φιλίας. ἄλλος ἔρω ς· [ὑπηρεσία θεῶν εἰς ναῶν κατακόσμησιν καὶ καλῶν] ὃν ἐπιβολὴν καλοῦσι φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον.

érōs dè epithymía sōmatikês synousías. állos érōs· epithymía philías. állos érōs· [hypēresía theôn eis naôn katakósmēsin kaì kalôn] hòn epibolḕn kaloûsi philopoiḯas dià kállos emphainómenon.

Eros is desire for bodily union. Another eros: desire for friendship. Another eros: [service of the gods for the adornment of temples and of beautiful things] which they call a directed impulse toward friend-making, occasioned by apparent beauty.

Plutarch, an opponent reporting the Stoics in order to press a paradox against them, gives their account of love as a hunt:

Chrysippus of Soli, Moral Fragments, Eulogikon: kms-ae, ref. 719

θήρα γάρ τις, φασίν, ἐστὶν ὁ ἔρως, ἀτελοῦς μέν, εὐφυοῦς δὲ μειρακίου πρὸς ἀρετήν.

thḗra gár tis, phasín, estìn ho érōs, ateloûs mén, euphyoûs dè meirakíou pròs aretḗn.

For love, they say, is a hunt: of a youth imperfect but well-natured, toward virtue.

The paradox Plutarch draws out lies in the same fragment: on the Stoic view all fools are ugly and only the wise are beautiful, so the imperfect youth cannot yet be loved; and when the hunt succeeds and the youth becomes wise, the love ends.

Stobaeus preserves the restriction of philía to the wise, on the ground that it requires pístis (trust) and steadfastness (the same pístis named in Epictetus 2.22 above), and the assignment of three verbs of loving to the excellent alone:

Chrysippus of Soli, Moral Fragments, Eulogikon: kms-ae, ref. 630

Ἐν μόνοις τε τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀπολείπουσι φιλίαν, ἐπεὶ ἐν μόνοις τούτοις ὁμόνοια γίνεται περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον· … Φιλίαν γὰρ ἀληθινὴν καὶ μὴ ψευδώνυμον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς πίστεως καὶ βεβαιότητος ὑπάρχειν· … Φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν μόνων εἶναι σπουδαίων.

en mónois te toîs sophoîs apoleípousi philían, epeì en mónois toútois homónoia gínetai perì tôn katà tòn bíon· … philían gàr alēthinḕn kaì mḕ pseudṓnymon adýnaton chōrìs písteōs kaì bebaiótētos hypárchein· … phasì dè kaì tò agapân kaì tò aspázesthai kaì tò phileîn mónōn eînai spoudaíōn.

They leave friendship to the wise alone, since only among them does concord about the things of life arise. … For true and not-falsely-named friendship cannot exist without trust and steadfastness. … And they say that to love, to embrace, and to befriend belong only to the excellent.

Clement of Alexandria preserves Chrysippus' definition of agápē:

Chrysippus of Soli, Moral Fragments, Eulogikon: kms-ae, ref. 292

ἀγάπη δὲ ὁμόνοια ἂν εἴη τῶν κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν τρόπον· ἢ συνελόντι φάναι κοινωνία βίου· ἢ ἐκτένεια φιλίας καὶ φιλοστοργίας μετὰ λόγου ὀρθοῦ περὶ χρῆσιν ἑταίρων.

agápē dè homónoia àn eíē tôn katà tòn lógon kaì tòn bíon kaì tòn trópon· ē synelónti phánai koinōnía bíou· ē ekténeia philías kaì philostorgías metà lógou orthoû perì chrêsin hetaírōn.

Agápē would be concord in lógos and life and character; or, to put it concisely, partnership in living; or intensity of friendship and affection (philostorgía) with right lógos in the treatment of companions.

In the same passage Clement glosses the neighbouring terms: philanthrōpía is the friendly treatment of human beings; philostorgía a kind of artistry (philotechnía) concerning affection for friends or kin; stérxis the preservation of goodwill (eúnoia) or of loving (agápēsis). Goodwill is given its own definition by Andronicus, who places eúnoia under boúlēsis (rational wish), itself one of the three eupátheiai (good emotions):

Chrysippus of Soli, Moral Fragments, Eulogikon: kms-ae, ref. 432

Εὔνοια μὲν οὖν ἐστι βούλησις ἀγαθῶν 〈ἑτέρῳ〉 αὐτοῦ ἕνεκεν ἐκείνου.

eúnoia mèn oûn esti boúlēsis agathôn 〈hetérō〉 autoû héneken ekeínou.

Goodwill, then, is a wish for good things for another, for that other's own sake.

This is the same disinterested willing of another's good that Marcus names among the things beautiful in themselves at 4.20.1 above.

Cleanthes of Assos

Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus, preserved by Stobaeus, uses neither philía nor érōs as a noun. It addresses Zeus as the cosmic lógos and names what makes things dear (phíla) to the divine: the fitting-together of opposites into one.

Cleanthes of Assos, Hymn to Zeus, Eulogikon: jew-ab, ref. 1

καὶ κοσμεῖν τἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν. Ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν πάντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν, ὥσθ’ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα.

kaì kosmeîn tákosma, kaì ou phíla soì phíla estín. hôde gàr eis hèn pánta synḗrmokas esthlà kakoîsin, hōsth’ héna gígnesthai pántōn lógon aièn eónta.

and to order the unordered, and what is not dear to you is dear to you. For thus you have fitted into one all things, good with bad, so that there comes to be one lógos of all things, everlasting.

The same fitting-together (synḗrmokas) of opposites into one returns in Marcus 9.9 above as the binding force that ascends from swarms to sympátheia among the stars.

What the passages hold in common

A few lemmas recur at the same load-bearing points across the five authors. Philía is restricted to the spoudaîos or sophós in Zeno (ref. 222), Chrysippus (ref. 630), and Epictetus (ref. 2.22), each time resting on pístis. Eúnoia is defined as the disinterested wish for another's good in Chrysippus (ref. 432) and named beautiful in itself in Marcus (ref. 4.20.1). Érōs is read as fire in Zeno (ref. 104) and defined as an impulse toward friend-making in Chrysippus (ref. 395, 397). The binding of opposites into one lógos in Cleanthes (ref. 1) and the gathering force in Marcus (ref. 9.9) sit on the same page of the survey. Erōs the noun reaches Epictetus only inside a line of Euripides; in the early Stoa it is a defined term.